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LETTERS
Bad behaviour does not equal
research fraud
I was not impressed by Dr Geggie’s article
offering a survey of the attitudes of newly
appointed consultants towards research fraud
(Journal of Medical Ethics 2001;27:344–6).
Indeed, by mixing up categories of miscon-
duct from what is at most “bad behaviour” to
the very serious, he is not entirely beyond
reproach himself. I remind readers that Dr
Geggie suggested that 55.7% of the respond-
ents had observed (from the title) “research
fraud”.
If the term “research fraud” is to have any
meaning, it must be reserved for conduct that
consciously and deliberately attempts to im-
pose a fraud on others. The US National
Academy of Sciences’ report, On Being a
Scientist: Responsible Conduct in Research
distinguishes clearly between “misallocation
of credit, honest errors, and errors caused
through negligence” and “deception, making
up data or results, changing or misreporting
data or results, and plagiarism”. The former
are “ethical transgressions . . . that generally
remain internal to the scientific commu-
nity . . . dealt with locally through peer review,
administrative action, and the system of
appointments and evaluations”. The latter
“strike at the heart of the values on which
science is based”. The White House’s Office of
Science and Technology Policy reached similar
conclusions, restricting research misconduct
to “fabrication, falsification and plagarism”. I
agree with these assessments.
In Dr Geggie’s paper, deception would
include deliberate falsification of data (cat-
egory 3 of Dr Geggie’s table 1), cheating (4A)
and deliberately plagiarising without attribu-
tion (4D). We then move into fairyland,
because Dr Geggie next asks “have you ever
been an author on a paper for which any of
the authors have not made a sufficient contri-
bution to warrant credit for the work” or “has
your name ever been omitted from a paper for
which you had made a substantial contribu-
tion”, and, surprise, surprise, over half an-
swered yes. These are examples of, at worst,
ethical transgressions (but more often exam-
ples of delusions of grandeur on the part of
the offended) but are not research fraud.
Those of us who run large research groups
know from experience that authorship of any
paper poses problems. I have never met
anyone, from the cleaner to the director, who
undervalued his/her own contribution to the
work! The issue arises with such consistency
that many labs (including my own) have long
documents on how to resolve the problem of
who goes on, and who stays off, the authors’
list. But research fraud? Give me a break!
Of those who responded, approximately
10% had personal knowledge of research
fraud, and 5% at most (it is not possible to tell
if there is overlap between those answering
different questions) admitted to acts that
could be regarded as research fraud. This cor-
responds to my own experience. I have spent
more than 40 years in human molecular
genetics, a very competitive field, of which 25
years has been spent running very large
groups. I know the work of over 1000
scientists well. I have personal knowledge of
one case of serious research fraud and
perhaps three or four cases where the report-
ing of data was so careless as to verge on mis-
conduct (though without intent to commit
fraud). I also know of one case of plagiarism.
To blur the boundaries between “research
fraud”, “research misconduct”, “possible fu-
ture misconduct”, and complaining about not
getting your name on a paper does no one any
good, and certainly does not help any rational
discussion about research ethics.
Bob Williamson
The Murdoch Childrens Research Institute, 10th
Floor, Royal Children’s Hospital, Flemington Road,
Parkville Vic 3052, Australia;
williamb@cryptic.rch.unimelb.edu.au
Author’s reply
Professor Williamson makes a valid point
about the term “research fraud” and I agree
that the term covers a number of different
categories of unethical behaviour. I also
pointed out that “Research fraud can take
many forms” in the discussion section of my
paper (Journal of Medical Ethics 2001;27:344–6).
For the purposes of my article I stated that
consultants who had answered “Yes” to ques-
tions 1, 2, or 3 of table 1 had reported
“observed misconduct” and I stand by this
conclusion. The dictionary on my bookshelf
(Concise Oxford Dictionary (6th ed)) defines
“misconduct” as “improper conduct, esp. adul-
tery; bad management” and I think that what
the consultants were reporting in the ques-
tionnaire fits this definition. The same diction-
ary includes in its definition of “fraud” the
phrases “use of false representations to gain
unjust advantage” and “person or thing not
fulfilling expectation or description”. The
behaviour described in questions 1, 2, and
3—that is inappropriate authorship, omission
of names of contributors who made a substan-
tial contribution, and the intentional altera-
tion of data for publication, fits this definition.
In the article I tried to use the term “fraud” as
a more general term than “misconduct” and I
apologise if this caused confusion. I think,
however, that the majority of readers (and cer-
tainly the majority of my colleagues) would
have had something approaching the above
definitions in mind when they read the article
(although several colleagues have told me to
get a more up-to-date dictionary!) Whilst I
acknowledge that Professor Williamson makes
a valid point, I do think there is a danger of any
rational discussion becoming bogged down in
semantics and I think it is clear from my arti-
cle what the initial data was and how I have
derived my variables.
Professor Williamson dismisses the medical
consultants (not cleaners!) who answered yes
to questions 1 and 2 as having “more often
delusions of grandeur” on their part. That is a
point of view—but I suspect the majority of
respondents to my questionnaire do not share
it. Indeed I think his attitude risks sweeping a
very real problem under the carpet and, whilst
I am aware of attempts to standardise author-
ship, I think this is a problem which requires
further investigation.
I find the overall tone of this letter and
phrases such as “into fairyland” and “give me
a break” inflammatory and this, unfortu-
nately, distracts from some valid points.
Professor Williamson’s main criticism ap-
pears to be that he has learnt nothing new
from my paper. The original idea for this study
came after a lively discussion in a bar about
the prevalence of research fraud (a subject of
which I knew very little). After this discussion
I did a literature search and could find only a
few references to research fraud and miscon-
duct. I decided to perform the study in an
attempt to answer the questions I had. I wish
that Professor Williamson had been present at
the original discussion—he could have saved
me a lot of trouble! On a more serious note, I
am sure that the professor is aware that in the
“hierarchy of evidence” questionnaire surveys
rank higher than anecdotal evidence and per-
sonal experience (although only just!). The
value of my article is that it adds evidence to a
subject in which there is a marked paucity of
hard facts.
I am sorry that Professor Williamson was
unimpressed with my paper. Unfortunately,
the very nature of the subject of research
fraud/misconduct mitigates against good
quality research. I am sure that readers would
welcome any double-blinded randomised
control trials (RCTs) on the subject and, if the
professor wishes to carry out some research in
this area I am sure that the scientific commu-
nity would welcome it.
D Geggie
Accident and Emergency Department, Arrowe Park
Hospital, Arrowe Park Road, Upton, Wirral,
Merseyside CH49 5PE, UK;
DAVID@GEGGIE.freeserve.co.uk
Ethical implications of consent
and confidentiality
Recently a prospective, observational clinical
study was carried out in the department of
ophthalmology, at a district general hospital.
The main purpose of the study was to evaluate
the medicolegal and ethical implication of
consent and confidentiality in ophthalmic
practice, in accordance with the guidelines
provided by medical law.
One hundred patients, who had been
referred by optometrists to ophthalmologists,
were included in the study. The general
ophthalmic services (GOS) 18 form, a referral
form used by optometrists for referring
patients to ophthalmologists, which allows
optometrists to share a patient’s medical
information with ophthalmologists, was used
as a study tool to evaluate the percentage of
patients giving signatory consent.
Data was also collected regarding patients’
awareness about the medicolegal implications
of consent and their views about their medical
information being shared among different
health care professionals in ophthalmic prac-
tice.
The results of our study show that only 15%
of GOS 18 forms contained written consent by
the patients for information to be shared by
their optometrist. The remaining 85% were
referred without obtaining an express written
consent.
These results were further supported by the
information generated from a questionnaire
filled in by patients attending the eye clinics.
The questionnaire includes the following three
simple questions: responses are alongside.
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Are you aware about the fact that you should
be consented by your optometrist on the
referral form? Yes/No (46% / 54%)
Did your optometrist explain to you about the
consent statement mentioned on the GOS 18
form? Yes/No (40% / 60%)
Would you like the ophthalmologist to make
available your medical information to your
optometrist/ophthalmic medical practitioner?
Yes/No (85% / 15%)
Conclusion
Only a few GOS 18 forms contained patients’
written consent for information to be sent
back to the referring optometrist.
Fifteen per cent of the patients surveyed,
said they did not wish information to be
shared with their optometrists. Therefore we
should be careful about sending back infor-
mation to optometrists where signatory con-
sent has not been given.
Optometrists need to be aware of this
potential issue. In the light of the increasingly
close relationship between optometrists and
ophthalmologists (especially where they
share care for glaucoma and postoperative
cataract patients) it is important for the
optometrist that consent is given if feedback
is required.
Discussion
A good doctor-patient relationship can be
defined by the three Cs: (i) Confidentiality, (ii)
Consent, and (iii) Competence. If any of these
three components are missing the doctor-
patient relationship could be damaged and
the flow of communication in both directions
inhibited.
A promise on the part of the doctor to
maintain patient confidentiality is central if
patients are to be allowed to speak freely. If
information is shared without the patient’s
consent then the faith of the patient in the
doctor may be forfeited.
Consent is an integral part of the GOS 18
referral form but our study shows that it is
taken for granted and is not handled in accord-
ance with guidelines set out in medical law.
Y Khan
SHO Ophthalmology, Ashford Hospital, London
Road, Middlesex, TW15 3AA, UK;
yasir1399@hotmail.com
R J Stirling
Darlington Memorial Hospital, Hollyhurst Road,
Darlington, DL3 6HX, UK
BOOK REVIEWS
Tuskegee’s Truths: Rethinking
the Tuskegee Syphilis Study
Edited by S M Reverby. University of North
Carolina Press, 2000, £52.50 (hc), £19.95
(sc), pp 630. ISBN 0-8078-4852-2
No one interested in the ethics of biomedical
research will have failed to hear about the
Tuskegee syphilis study, or, to give it its full
title, the US Public Health Service’s Tuskegee
Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male. This
study, conducted from 1932 to 1972, on black
(African American) males in Tuskegee, Ala-
bama, has, with complete justification, be-
come the paradigm of moral depravity in the
field of biomedical research. Virtually every
rule of good, ethical research was broken dur-
ing this “research” over a period of 40 years,
down to denying participants even the knowl-
edge, let alone the option, of a remedy when it
became available.
In recent years, the Tuskegee syphilis study
has received renewed public attention, for two
reasons. First, in 1996, 24 years after the
cessation of the study, President Clinton
provided a formal federal apology, saying to
the survivors that “[w]e can look at you in the
eye and finally say on behalf of the American
people, what the United States government
did was shameful, and I am sorry”. With this
apology, Clinton not only accepted moral
responsibility—something not easily done by
governments in the affairs of state, domestic
or foreign—but also contributed to addressing
African Americans’ distrust of health care and
biomedical research, a distrust fuelled by the
legacy of Tuskegee.
Second, echoes of Tuskegee have been
heard in the ongoing debate about the ethics
of biomedical research financed or conducted
in the developing world by government agen-
cies and companies from the developed world,
particularly in regard to HIV/AIDS. Such
research raises ethical questions, relating to
key issues such as exploitation and justice,
informed consent, and duties of beneficence.
David J Rothman puts the underlying concern
as follows: “Until the 1990s American medical
researchers performed most of their experi-
ments on other Americans—frequently
choosing subjects who were poor and vulner-
able. Now, however, they are increasingly
likely to conduct their investigations in third
world countries on subjects who are even
poorer and more vulnerable”.1 HIV/AIDS and
escaping the possibility of financial and regu-
latory burdens are cited as reasons for this
shift. The ethics of Tuskegee has been
internationalised.
For this reason, but also for several others,
Susan M Reverby’s edited volume, Tuskegee’s
Truths: Rethinking the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, is a
welcome, and indeed magisterial, addition to
the Tuskegee literature. In a volume of 630
pages, the editor has put together a resource
containing virtually everything one would
wish to know about the Tuskegee study—
information, transcripts of historical docu-
ments, reflections, moral lessons. In a single
volume one gets a panorama, as well as
detailed mapping, of this sorry saga in US
biomedical ethics.
The book begins with an Overview (part I)
and Contemporary background (part II). This
is followed by an extensive section, Docu-
menting the issues (part III), which includes
material such as the testimony by four survi-
vors from the United States Senate hearings
on human experimentation, in 1973. Part IV
focuses on The Question of treatment, while
part V is an Historical reconsideration. The
much debated role played by nurse Rivers is
rethought in part VI. The Legacy of Tuskegee
is considered in part VII, while Key actors
rethink the study in part VIII. Part IX,
Imagining the Tuskegee syphilis study, moves
into the realm of fiction and poetry, with,
among others, selections from the play, Miss
Evers’ Boys. The final part, part X, Apology and
beyond, contains such significant recent
documents as President Clinton’s apology
speech and Marcia Angell’s 1997 editorial in
the New England Journal of Medicine.
I strongly recommend this important vol-
ume for anyone interested in the ethics of
biomedical research. By rethinking the past
we may understand the dangers inherent in
such research. From the perspective of the
developing world, we need to be armed with
the knowledge to help us prevent history from
repeating itself, at least in this respect.
W A Landman
Reference
1 Rothman DJ. The shame of medical research.
The New York Review of Books
2000;XLVII:60–4.
Genes, Women, Equality
M B Mahowald. Oxford University Press,
2000, US$39.95 (hb), pp 314. ISBN 0–19–
512110–4
Far too often it is still assumed that if feminist
bioethics has any role to play, its contribution
lies purely in reproductive ethics. Mary
Mahowald’s Genes, Women, Equality should dis-
pel that delusion once and for all, along with
a second illusion: that the new genetics is
gender-neutral.
Mahowald is not a bioethical Luddite: she is
not concerned to attack the new genetics, but
to make good the failure of bioethicists and
scientists to explore the differential impact of
the new genetics on women. Specific implica-
tions for women of advances in genetics in
different fields form the bulk of the book, with
chapters on genetic counselling; genetics
research; allocation of genetic services; cul-
ture and sex selection; misattributed pater-
nity and cystic fibrosis; sickle cell disease and
carrier testing; breast cancer susceptibility
testing; preimplantation genetic diagnosis
and abortion; genomic alternation; geneti-
cally linked alcoholism, employment and
insurance testing, and human cloning.
This last chapter is a prime example of the
need for Mahowald’s sort of analysis: how
often is it recognised that even therapeutic
cloning and stem cell research, such as was
recently approved by the UK parliament,
affect women differently from men? The obvi-
ous reason is that large numbers of enucle-
ated eggs will be required, and that enucle-
ated eggs come from women, taken in a
painful and difficult procedure. But as Ma-
howald mildly notes, so far as the further step
of human cloning goes: “Interestingly, while
some bioethicists expressed concerns about
the impact of human cloning on cloned indi-
viduals, none, to my knowledge, indicated
that there were gender differences to worry
about as well” (pages 281–2).
These practical chapters show Mahowald’s
clinical knowledge to good advantage (al-
though a philosopher, she is professor in the
college, the Department of Obstetrics and
Gynecology, the Committee on Genetics and
the MacLean Center for Clinical Medical Eth-
ics at the University of Chicago.) Her analysis
is particularly clear here, and in other “repro-
genetics” chapters, especially in the distinc-
tion she draws between genetic, gestational,
and lactational motherhood. She rightly
draws our attention to a fourth form of moth-
erhood which can also now occur: the
provision of enucleated eggs, into which
another set of genes is inserted. Which of
these is “real” motherhood?
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There are also a series of “mid-level theory”
chapters, such as that on Disabilities, femi-
nism and caregiving, which is informed by the
split in feminist thought between disability
rights feminists such as Adrienne Asch, who
distrust genetic screening and correlated
abortion on the grounds that they discrimi-
nate against the disabled, and other feminists
such as Christine Overall,1 or Mahowald
herself, who distinguish between the legiti-
mate abortion of fetuses with disabilities and
advocacy for disabled people (and their carers,
usually women). The analysis in both the
“specific issues” and the “mid-level” chapters
will be of enormous use to both practitioners
and academics.
Mahowald also attempts to provide a
normative foundation for the two less theo-
retical sorts of chapters, particularly in her
chapter 4, Gender justice in genetics. Here she
employs what she terms a feminist standpoint
approach or egalitarian feminist model, which
directs our attention towards power imbal-
ances. Where inequalities result from rectifi-
able social power imbalances rather than
unalterable and value-neutral differences, the
standpoint of the less powerful group should
be privileged over that of the more powerful,
in this model. “Some differences entail
inequalities; others are merely associated with
them” (page 74). Inequalities which persist by
mere association, such as the continued
association of women with caregiving, are
more easily rectifiable; biological differences,
such as the fact that it is women who give
birth, are harder to remedy, but we should try
to minimise their impact. Certainly we should
not allow necessary biological inequality to
become an excuse for avoidable social in-
equality, but that is what some aspects of the
new genetics risk doing.
The feminist standpoint model is frequently
contrasted with a conservative libertarian
model, as the theoretical overview which has so
far dominated in the new genetics. While I
agree with this part of Mahowald’s analysis, I
am less convinced that the liberal feminist
model is always wrong, even though I do not
count myself a liberal feminist. There is a
certain risk of demonisation of the liberal
feminist view, which Mahowald does not
always avoid; it is not the same as libertarian-
ism. On the whole, however, this is a vital book
for anyone interested in the new genetics—yes,
even for those who don’t actually think they
are also interested in feminism.
D Dickenson
Reference
1 Overall C. New reproductive technologies
and practices: benefits or liabilities for
children? In: Dickenson D, ed. Ethical issues in
maternal-fetal medicine. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002.
On Dying Well: An Anglican
Contribution to the Debate on
Euthanasia
Board for Social Responsibility of the Church
of England, Church House Publishing, 2000,
£4.95, 94 pages, 0 7151 6587 9
For any reader interested in euthanasia, On
Dying Well gives an accessible yet detailed
account of the Church of England’s view on
the subject. First published in 1975, this short
report is the product of the Church’s Board for
Social Responsibility, which brought together
theologians, philosophers, lawyers, and medi-
cal professionals to form a working party with
the remit of examining euthanasia. The
second edition of On Dying Well leaves most of
the original working party report findings
unaltered, but adds a new introduction by
Professor Stuart Horner, chairman of the
British Medical Association’s ethics com-
mittee from 1989 to 1997. Other changes to
the first edition are a redrafted chapter on the
legal questions surrounding euthanasia in
light of new cases pertinent to the debate and
additional reflections on the report’s medical
content. Also included is an updated bibliog-
raphy, listing publications produced after 1975
and, in appendix form, the 1993 Joint
Submission to the House of Lords Select
Committee on Medical Ethics made by the
House of Bishops of the Church of England
and the Roman Catholic Bishops’ Conference
of England and Wales.
On Dying Well is a report of broad-ranging
scope which, not surprisingly, robustly rejects
the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia. This
rejection operates in two ways—marshalling
both principled, theologically grounded
rhetoric and more practical, medically orien-
tated arguments and clinical case studies.
Thus, in his introduction, while acknowledg-
ing that most churches “would now approve
the language of human rights”, Professor
Horner rejects what he terms an “unbridled”
notion of autonomy which ignores an “ulti-
mate accountability to God”. Then on a more
practical level, he stresses the significant
impact that developments in palliative care
have had on care of the dying, arguing that in
the vast majority of cases “there is almost no
reason today for patients with an incurable
condition to die in agony and distress”.
Lamenting that hospice care is not available to
all terminally ill patients, Professor Horner
nevertheless maintains that this is no reason
to write euthanasia into the statute books. He
dismisses arguments that focus on poor
standards of terminal care as a justification
for legalising euthanasia, adding that it seems
“utterly illogical that if doctors are guilty of
bad terminal care, society should then award
them greater powers to remedy the problem”.
This reference to the distribution of
“power” within the doctor-patient relation-
ship goes to the heart of the euthanasia
debate, as conceptions of what constitutes
“good death” are negotiated and renegotiated
against a backdrop of ever-changing medical
practice and wider societal values. There are
those who do, of course, reject the view that
the legalisation of euthanasia represents an
allocation of “greater powers” to doctors, but
instead view euthanasia as a crucial element
in securing personal autonomy and self deter-
mination for the patient. When the Voluntary
Euthanasia Society published its 1976 rejoin-
der to the first edition of On Dying Well it con-
cluded that the church’s report was “deter-
mined, and often distorted by . . . an absolute
prior rejection of euthanasia”.
However, the focus of the church’s report is
largely on the potential implications of legalis-
ing euthanasia and interestingly, both the
theological and the medical chapters of the
book concede that there may be “exceptional
cases” in which euthanasia is morally permis-
sible. It is argued that such instances, judged
by the report to be extremely rare, are best
dealt with on a case by case basis rather than
by altering the status of the law. The report
concludes that the legalisation of euthanasia
would have numerous damaging effects,
including reducing the incentive to improve
provision of care for the dying; placing
patients under pressure to seek an end to their
lives, and, ultimately, increasing the risk of
non-voluntary euthanasia.
Some readers will be left unsatisfied by this
endorsement of the “slippery slope” view of
legalising euthanasia. Similarly, not every
reader will be satisfied with the conclusion
that euthanasia excludes the administration
of drugs to relieve pain or distress, even if this
does, on occasion, and as the report concedes,
carry the risk of shortening life. On this front,
the report is vulnerable to the charge that it
retreats behind euphemisms—emphasising
the proposed “intention” of a doctor solely to
relieve pain, but avoiding difficult questions
that accompany the acknowledgement that a
patient’s life may be shortened as a result.
Nevertheless, the medical and theological
pragmatism of the report stands in contrast to
the unbending position that might have been
offered. There will be those who, perhaps
unable to view the question of euthanasia
through the particular religious lens of the
Church of England, will share similar anxie-
ties about the repercussions of legalising
assisted suicide.
The highly publicised efforts of motor neu-
rone disease patient Diane Pretty to secure her
“right to die” have once again stirred the
sometimes dormant but ever present debate
over euthanasia. The media coverage has
brought into focus now well rehearsed
positions—where respect for autonomy and
individual choice compete with sanctity of life
and “slippery slope” arguments. On Dying Well
reiterates these arguments but also offers new
insights and analysis. It is worth noting that
in the same week that Diane Pretty’s case
made the headlines, Dame Cicely Saunders, a
contributor to the church’s report, was
awarded the $1m Hilton Humanitarian Prize
for her hospice work in the care of the dying.
The philosophical debate surrounding eutha-
nasia has reached an impasse. The “solution”
for now, appears to lie in allowing death with
at least some degree of self regulation but
without appeals to changes in the law.
L Campbell
Bio Engagement: Making a
Christian Difference through
Bioethics Today
Edited by N M de S Cameron, S E Daniels, B
J White. William B Eerdmans Publishing Com-
pany, 2000, £14.99, pp 265 + xiii. ISBN
0-8028-4793-5
This book is concerned with advocating a pro-
life stance rather than with detailed discus-
sions of the medical ethics of biotechnology.
The essays are written from the particular
Christian perspective of conservative evan-
gelicanism and the writers are committed to
the verbal inspiration of scripture. It is a book
which will be of interest to a certain section of
the Christian church. One constraint with this
approach is the sense of the discussion taking
place “in house”, calling Christians of like
mind to defend a pro-life stance on health
care. Occasionally writers with contrasting
points of view are mentioned but there is no
sustained discussion of their arguments. The
pervasive advocacy of the pro-life view only
occasionally yields to a recognition of the
complexity of the issues and the general,
unacademic, level of the discussions does not
provide any detailed argument and support
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for the ethical presupposition of the book,
which is simply assumed.
This is a work that takes its cue from the
idea of “engagement”; the wide ranging
discussions of biology and biotechnology cur-
rently taking place are not covered, rather the
focus is on abortion, and to a lesser extent,
euthanasia. Several essays show how Chris-
tians holding pro-life views can best make
their position known, how to defend their
view in encounters with the media and what
to do when moral perplexities are presented
in clinical practice or training. Case studies are
used to support the overall programme of the
book and are not subject to the analysis which
might have been expected.
More technical, ethical discussion occurs in
the section Law and public policy, where there
is an awareness of the complexity of the issues
relating to the use of unfertilised eggs which
might later be fertilised. And in Casey’s essay,
How the law will shape our life and death
decisions: the case of the human embryo,
there is detailed discussion of various impor-
tant court cases in the United States. But here
again the argument seems to presuppose too
much to make his case convincing no matter
how interesting the hints towards ethical
solutions might be. In keeping with the theme
“making a difference”, Casey concludes his
paper with a proposal for legislation. There is
an interesting criticism in this section of the
liberal outlook, namely that liberalism ends in
its response to those who object to liberalism.
Overall then there is a paucity of technical
discussion of medical ethics in this book. Even
the practical discussions are couched in the
manner of advocacy rather than analysis. The
particular Christian perspective does not seem
likely to make the book useful from the point
of view of developing discussion even among
Christian ethicists. Christian medical practi-
tioners who share the outlook of the authors
will be encouraged to advance their views in
the present climate of opinion, where decisive
battles are won by political lobbying. But even
some who are sympathetic to the stance of
this book, including this reviewer, will de-
mand more sustained argument and sophisti-
cated presentation of their view.
N Fennemore
Textbook of Research Ethics:
Theory and Practice
S Loue. Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers,
2000, US$55.00 (hb), pp 255+xix. ISBN
0-306-46448-9
Research ethics is high on the agenda of
medical ethics and regulatory topics world-
wide at the moment. In this field it is thus
important to have good textbooks, to educate
health care professionals, researchers, ethi-
cists, students, and policy makers about the
nature of research ethics, its history and social
contexts. Professor Loue’s book is thus pub-
lished in an increasingly competitive market-
place.
The book has many merits. It consists of five
chapters and two appendices. The first chapter
summarises several of the iconic scandals in
medical ethics, notably the Tuskegee syphilis
study and the Nazi doctors’ atrocities. The
historical scholarship of this chapter is solid, if
not original, and it is useful to have it
gathered here in a convenient place. There is a
serious debate to be had about the pedagogy
and philosophy of starting research ethics
from a consideration of its worst breaches:
does this blind students to the myriad of more
minor but more pressing problems that arise
in “routine” research? Does it encourage the
thought that ethics is about hard cases only?
Does it take seriously the fact that research
ethics is, historically speaking, an evolving
discipline? Nevertheless, this is the traditional
place to start, and Loue does it very well.
The second chapter summarises some of
the main theoretical positions in bioethics.
This is the weakest chapter in the book,
several times stating a thumbnail sketch of a
position (for example, lesbian ethics) with a
list of pros and cons before moving on. A sur-
vey is always vulnerable to this fault, of
course. More seriously, in my view, these
views are set out, but few of them are
seriously illustrated in the remainder of the
book. A more ambitious book would have
given a more thorough sketch of what, for
instance, Gilligan’s ethics of care would say
about HIV vaccine trials in the Third World.
The promise of non-utilitarian, non-
principlist approaches in research ethics has
often been asserted, but rarely has a serious
attempt been made to apply them in a
systematic way.
Chapters three and four analyse the ethical
issues that arise in study design and imple-
mentation. These chapters are very compe-
tently done, but focus in the main on consent
and confidentiality, with interesting material
(and this is unusual) on conflicts of interest
and the rights and duties of the controller of
research data relating to publication and use.
Chapter five is a valuable account of the regu-
latory and legal frameworks governing re-
search in the United States. This chapter is of
little direct applicability for non-US readers,
but is most informative for both students of
comparative bioethics and for researchers
who wish their studies to have US sites or to
be acceptable to US sponsors and regulators.
In an increasingly globalised research context,
this is a valuable asset. On the other hand,
there is relatively little in the book about
international research.
The book closes with a pair of appendices,
one setting out in some detail the various
kinds of research study design and the other
setting out the principles of US law. Both of
these are very useful and helpful, and should
be of great assistance to readers who are
unfamiliar with either—a situation common
enough, since research ethics interests both
the researcher (who may know no law or eth-
ics) and the ethicist (whose grasp of research
design may be weak).
The book is not comprehensive: gaps
include health services and nursing research,
and human rights in medical research. A use-
ful feature is the inclusion of exercises for the
reader, although these are very taxing at
times, and no model solutions are provided.
In summary this is a valuable textbook,
which aptly summarises much of current
scholarship in research ethics. It would be
suitable for undergraduate or postgraduate
courses in medical ethics and in research
methods. I find the price of the book rather
high, considering the existence of more
affordable alternatives. That said, the teacher
of research ethics will find this a very useful
addition to his or her library.
R E Ashcroft
NOTICES
6th World Congress of Bioethics
The 6th World Congress of Bioethics will be
held in Brasilia, from 30 October to 3 Novem-
ber 2002. The congress is sponsored by the
International Association of Bioethics, the
Brazilian Society of Bioethics, the Center for
Studies and Research in Bioethics (University
of Brazil), the Brazilian Federal Council of
Medicine and the Latin American and Carib-
bean Federation of Bioethics Institutions.
The theme of the congress is bioethics: power
and injustice.
For further information please see:
www.bioethicscongress.org.br
News from the Centre for the
Study of Global Ethics, the
University of Birmingham
The new weekend short course programme
includes Global Bioethics (June) and Devel-
opment Ethics (September).
The new MSc in Global Ethics begins in
October 2002, with modules including: Global
Ethics; Globalisation and Governance; Con-
flict Humanitarian Aid; Non-Governmental
Organisations in a Changing International
Context; Research Methods, and practical
placements in non-governmental organisa-
tions, as well as the above course topics.
For further information please contact:
Helen Harris on +44 (0)121 693 4687.
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